I have not received any remuneration for this paper nor have I financial interest in any company cited in this working paper. The Wellpoint -Express Scripts deal is not a typical outsourcing of benefits management where there is little risk to the benefits manager that its costs would not be covered by fees or reimbursements. What is different is that this deal involves a full "book of business" -revenues as well as costs -and it includes a substantial share of risky, fixed premium insurance plans.
Express Scripts' current business of servicing self-insured plans is completely different from Wellpoint's business of managing a mix of fixed premium and administrative services only (ASO) plans. Express Scripts is a benefits reseller, not a benefits administrator. Ingredient and dispensing costs from pharmacies and rebates from Pharma flow first to Express Scripts who is allowed by contract to mark-up these costs or retain a portion of the rebates before passing them on to self-insured clients. In Wellpoint's ASO plans, 100% of claim costs are passed directly to the client without flowing through the insurer's financial statements.
Contracts of the Big 3 independent PBMs do contain transparent management fees, but these pale in proportion to opaque margins made on pharmacy reimbursements and retained rebates. In a recent paper, we estimated that Medco's management fees averaged $6.52 per member per year (PMPY) while transactional gross profits averaged $42.66 PMPY.
If
Medco's business model were ASO instead of benefits reseller, it would have to charge Important detail about the deal was provided by Express Scripts CEO Jerry Hall in an interview granted to CFO.com. 4 He noted that most of the valuation was based on a projection of cash flow over the life of the contract and that there was also a significant payment to Wellpoint in consideration for structuring the deal so the tax consequences were favorable to Express Scripts.
When Express Scripts acquired the pharmacy-benefit-management business of Wellpoint in a $4.675 billion deal announced Monday, an important part of the linchpin of the deal for Express Scripts was its acquisition of ten years worth of projected cash flow and 25 million new clients, says Jeff Hall, the company's CFO.
In putting the acquisition together overall, the finance chief was particularly focused on getting an accurate assessment of how much cash Wellpoint's business would produce in the future.
Also included for the purchase price was consideration for the value of a future tax benefit for Express Scripts based on the structure of the transaction. As a result of the arrangement, the company will be able to claim depreciation on most of the purchase price over 15 years, according to Hall. Assuming the company's 37 percent tax bracket, it would get about $300 million a year of tax deductions, which will amount to $100 million to $125 million a year in tax savings. Without that advantage, Express Scripts would have paid a billion dollars less for the deal, says Hall.
There is also a quote from Wellpoint CEO Angela Braly suggesting that this deal would not result in a complete transfer of management responsibilities.
5
Wellpoint will retain control of medical policy, formulary and integrated disease management, and will work alongside Express Scripts to offer best-in-class pharmacy management and data analytics. Wellpoint members will gain access to better Web, home delivery and customer service capabilities, and clients will benefit from enhanced reporting.
Wellpoint would be retaining control of some aspects of plan design. But, Wellpoint said nothing about who will be in charge of marketing and sales and who will handle claims and data management other than that they "will work alongside Express Scripts".
This paper will present the case that, from an efficiency standpoint, it is likely that Wellpoint will continue to manage most of the sales and general administration. Express Script will take charge of the promotion of mail order and direct efforts to convert the largest plans to Express Script's benefits reseller business model. Consistent with this division of responsibility, it is likely that Express Scripts will be making substantial payments back to Wellpoint for its administrative work.
The final section of the paper examines some regulatory issues that accompany Express Scripts' take-over of the 47% of Wellpoint's book of business comprised of risky, fixed premium plans held by small businesses, individuals, and seniors under Medicare Part D plans.
The Variety of PBM Business Models
Wellpoint's PBM business is comprised of a mix of plans covering the 25 million people and 265 million prescriptions per year. These plans include small and large employer plans, government employee plans, individual plans, and Medicare Part D plans. The group and individual plans also can be categorized by business model -the basis a company chooses for collecting revenue and incurring costs.
Wellpoint has two basic business models: risk-based insurance contracts based on transparent fixed premiums and self-insured administration service only (ASO) contracts also based on transparent management fees.
While Wellpoint does not report any breakdown of PBM plans by business model, we can derive a rough approximation of this distribution from 10-K data on covered lives in medical plans. 6 This is presented in Table 1 below. Note Wellpoint reports 35 million lives covered by medical plans but only 25 million lives covered by pharmacy plans. This means that a considerable number of customers "carve-out" pharmacy benefits and turn management over to an independent PBM. are self-insured ASO plans. We also assume that all individual and senior (Medicare) accounts are risky, fixed premium plans.
The only question is the distribution of local, small business plans by business model.
Fortuitously, this is only remaining group type and the amount is a "plug" once all the other line items are distributed. Table 2 becomes useful later in estimating the extent to which Express 
PBM Covered Lives 25,000
Scripts can switch Wellpoint customers from low profit, risk premium plans to higher profit benefits reseller plans. One difficulty with interpreting the above graph is determining how much of this trend is due to the traditional pharmacy business and how much is due to the specialty pharmacy business.
For example, it is likely that the ratchet up in 2005 was due to the purchases of independent specialty pharmacy operations like Priority Health for Express Scripts.
It will be interesting to see how Express Scripts reports EBITDA / Adj. Rx after it closes the Wellpoint deal because the acquisition will likely reduce combined EBITDA / Adj. Rx. For the first year or so, our bet is that Express Scripts will report the Wellpoint financials on a separate line, claiming that this business is materially different than their core benefits reseller business.
The Express Script -Wellpoint Deal
In a recent interview granted to CFO.com, Express Scripts' CEO Jerry Hall acknowledged that the key to the valuation of the deal was the projected cash flow of a 10 year contract to manage Wellpoint's PBM business. 4 By subtracting a tax benefit of $1 Billion -the present value of $100 -$125 Million per year over 10 years --and a $200 Million estimate for the value of physical assets, we derive an estimate in Table 3 To what extent are these differences in profitability due to superior negotiating power based on scale? How much is due to focused benefits management driving mail order penetration rates (MOPR) and generic dispensing rates (GDR)? In other words, how much is due to the ability of large independent PBMs to drive benefit management efficiencies that presumably are passed on in part to customers in the form of lower prices with the rest going to EBITDA?
Leveraging Overhead Costs as a Factor
Before we embark on an examination of the questions posed above, we want to consider first leveraging overhead costs as a factor. Express Scripts has talked only about realizing value through more efficient benefits management, starting with improving the mail order penetration rate (MOPR). Neither Express Scripts nor Wellpoint has mentioned anything about cost-saving or profit-enhancement via leveraging overhead costs.
Yet, when we talked to a Wall Street analyst, leveraging overhead was the first thing mentioned as a potential driver of value in this deal. Leveraging overhead has been one of the stated value-enhancing benefits of recent mergers among independent PBMs and between PBMs and independent specialty pharmacy operations. We now want to use this argument as the basis for estimating the SG&A leveraging potential of this deal. Adjusted Scripts r4 Table 5 r8  284  502  798  Table 5 There is something wrong with this estimate. Realistically, on a unit basis, the cost of managing pharmacy benefits is much less than the cost of managing medical benefits. It would be inappropriate to apply a single overhead application rate across all of Wellpoint's insurance lines -medical the same as pharmacy the same as disability.
The $2.89 figure at the top of Table 6 is too high of an estimate. On the other hand, if we could truly estimate Wellpoint's incremental cost of managing pharmacy benefits, we believe that it would be less than Express Script's $1.71 figure because of Wellpoint's account leverage capability. Despite the averages presented in Table 6 , Wellpoint, not Express Scripts, is the more efficient entity at managing the PBM SG&A costs, especially the sales component, because of its ability to leverage account management costs over multiple product lines.
In order to minimize SG&A / Adj. Rx, we believe that it would be better for Express Scripts to have Wellpoint continue to manage the sales and general account management of its PBM book of business. It is likely that details about the division of responsibility for managing SG&A had not been worked out when the deal was first announced in April of 2009. Because this deal was not a clean transfer of a book of business, we believe that there will be ongoing friction between these two companies over who is responsible for SG&A management and how it is to be done.
If Express Scripts assumes complete SG&A responsibility for Wellpoint's PBM book of business, it could expect to incur an incremental cost somewhat less that its current average of $1.71 due to increased script scale. On the other hand, Wellpoint might be willing to remain responsible for most of the SG&A function for a fee that covers the incremental SG&A cost of managing its own book of business. Because of account management leveraging, we believe that this incremental cost is, say, $1.00, much less than Express Script figure of $1.71.
Viewing the bottom of Table 6 , we take this analysis a step further by reconstructing Wellpoint's PBM gross profits using a more realistic SG&A application rate of $1.00 per adjusted script.
Given the current estimated EBITDA of $1.16, this implies a current estimated gross profit per adjusted script of $2.16.
This means that differences in profitability between these two PBMs is much more that the EBITDA difference of $.1.59 --$1.16 vs $2.75. It is closer to $2.29 -the difference in estimated gross profits per adjusted script --$2.16 versus $4.45.
In Table 4 , we estimated that Express Scripts' $4. A different way to articulate this deal is to say that Express Scripts is paying a present value of $2.66 --$1.66 plus a continuing SG&A fee of $1.00 --for the rights to Wellpoint's book of business gross profits cash flow. This is a premium over the current gross profits cash flow of $2.16 --$1.16 plus a realistic SG&A cost of $1.00. The incremental EBITDA that Express Scripts needs in order to justify its valuation is still the same --$.60.
While we believe that Wellpoint will continue to be responsible for routine SG&A management, Express Scripts will be active when it comes to promoting changes in plan designs and business models. The first priority of Express Scripts will be to indoctrinate the Wellpoint organization on the important of promoting mail order. They will urge the Wellpoint organization to promote mail order an "opt out" rather than a "opt in" option. The second priority will be to have Express Script people directly responsible for the pharmacy benefits management portion of the largest ASO plans with over 1,000 members. The objective here will be to try to convert these plans to a benefits reseller model. The third objective will be to try to convert all fixed premium clients over, say 150 members, to a self-insured ASO model. 12 We also needed an estimate of gross profits per adjusted script of mail order generic and brand prescriptions. We assumed than an improved MOPR generated additional gross profits that fall right to the bottom line without an additional operating costs being incurred. We used estimates of gross profits per adjusted mail order script derived in our quantification of Medco's business model. 13 The estimates are presented in Table 7 below.
The result is that Express Scripts would barely cover the 43% premium it paid for Wellpoint.
Something else must underlie their belief that they can generate a return significantly greater than $1.66 EBITDA / Adj. Rx. At best, we estimate that Express Scripts will be able to convert half of small businesses to selfinsured plans. That leaves Express Scripts with risk exposure amounting to about 29% of Wellpoint's book of business, as presented below in Table 8 . At best, Express Scripts will be exposed to premium risk for 7 million covered lives or about 10% of its expanded book of business. This exposure is far more than Medco or CVS / Caremark. "decapitation" as quantified above in Table 8 .
PBM Valuation as a Function of Business Model
After the Wellpoint deal was announced, the CFO and the CEO of Cigna, a large integrated insurance company, remarked publicly that it was considering selling its captive PBM operations. Cigna admitted that their motivation for selling received a tremendous boost after analyzing Express Scripts' bid.
Shortly thereafter, an Oppenheimer financial analyst, Carl McDonald, was quoted as valuing the Cigna PBM at $1.3 Billion. 14 The purpose of this section is to present an estimate of the EBITDA / Adj. Rx implied by this valuation and use it as another data point in support of our contention that differences in PBM valuations are mostly due to differences in business model rather than management efficiency. The key assumption in the model we are developing is that the differences in valuation --$2.08
for Cigna and $1.66 for Wellpoint -are solely due to differences in plan mix. This is a reasonable assumption in that the GDRs of the two operations are similar. We also assume that both valuations include a premium based on the expectation of easily improved EBITDA from increasing the MOPR to around 20%.
The remaining explanatory variables are script scale and plan mix. The fact that Cigna's implied EBITDA / Adj. Rx is greater despite Wellpoint being 3.3 times the script count tends to rule out scale as an important factor.
An estimate of the EBITDA of individual plan components is derived in Table 10 The problem with our comparison is that it does not take into account the relative SG&A efficiency of integrated insurance companies relative to independent PBMs. Earlier, we suggested that the true incremental PBM SG&A / Adj Rx of an integrated insurance company to be around $1.00 versus Express Scripts' $1.71. When that is factored in, the estimate of the gain from converting an ASO plan to a benefits reseller plan is much more than $.20 in EBITDA. It is a business model conversion gain of $.91 in gross profits offset by a $.71 loss in SG&A as show in Table 11 below. In Table 7 , we estimated that a doubling of Wellpoint's MOPR from 10% to 20% could improve profitability significantly to $1.70, but that just covered the $1.66 valuation underlying Express Scripts' $ 4.675 Billion bid.
We have argued that the only way Express Scripts can improve EBITDA beyond the $1.66 to the $1.70 range is plan conversions from fixed premium to ASO and from ASO to benefits reseller. Based on our simultaneous equation model of EBITDA as a function of plan mix, we present in Table 12 below quantitative estimates of Express Scripts' potential to increase EBITDA through plan conversion. Later that day, a Reuters report mentioned unnamed analysts as valuing the deal at between $1.6 Billion and $1.8 Billion.
20 Table 13 below presents our own valuation of Aetna based on our model of PBM valuation as function of plan mix. Based on an Aetna mix of 33% fixed / 67% ASO, which is less profitable than the Cigna mix of 25% fixed / 75% ASO, we arrived at an estimated weighted average valuation of $1.92 EBITDA / Adj Rx for Aetna versus our earlier estimate for Cigna of $2.08.
Our estimate for Aetna translates into a valuation of $1.3 Billion, much less than Wall Street estimates of $1.6 Billion to $2.0 Billion. Again, we think that Wall Street does not sufficiently take into account business model as the most important factor in the profitability of a PBM book of business, focusing more on real and imagined variations in benefit management efficiencies and scale as the key to PBM valuation. We argued earlier that the difference between the Wellpoint and Cigna valuations can be explained entirely by business model mix. Management efficiency was ruled out because both have similar GDRs and both valuations imply an improvement in MOPR to the 20% level.
Differences in SG&A leverage was also ruled out as an explanatory variable as both were large integrated insurance companies with the same account management approaches managing SG&A.
Wellpoint's PBM is three times the size of Cigna's as measured by script scale. But, whatever advantage scale gives Wellpoint over Cigna, it is completely negated by Wellpoint's relatively high proportion of low profit, fixed premium plans.
We next want to offer an explanation of the difference in profitability implied by the Cigna valuation and the actual profitability of Express Scripts. Express Scripts is almost 6 times the size of Cigna as measured by script scale -502 Million vs 85 Million Adj. Rx. It also manages 5.4 times the number of covered lives that Cigna manages -50 Million versus 9.2 Million.
But a good portion of Cigna's business is made up of Fortune 50 accounts with 100,000+
members that can be managed very efficiently as measured by SG&A / Adj. Rx. The difference between Cigna's valuation of $2.08 and Express Scripts' actual profitability of $2.75 can be explained by a combination of differences in business model offset by differences in SG&A efficiency as we have demonstrated in Table 11 .
What remains is an explanation of the differences in actual 2008 profitability between Express Scripts and Medco. We believe that this difference --$2.75 versus $ 3.08 -is partly attributable to Medco's industry leading MOPR of 40% versus Express Scripts' MOPR of 24%, and partly attributable to business model differences, although they are both benefits resellers.
We should mention that the Medco MOPR is inflated by the fact that it manages the mail order portion only of the large Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan. We have estimated that this anomaly contributes 3 percentage points to Medco's MOPR. 22 As we have show in our update at quantifying Medco's business model, prescriptions filled by Even with extensive pass-through of rebates to customers, Medco's success in obtaining rebates is actually a net loss to clients in terms of lower GDR and drug spend / Adj Rx delivered. Four years ago, the GDR gap was 4 percentage points, but in 2008 the gap has narrowed to 2 percentage points. Express Scripts has been promoting GDR as a key metric for comparing PBM performance and this may be why Medco has worked to close this gap.
A General View of the Relation between PBM Scale and Performance
We want summarize our general view of PBM scale as a source of PBM performance. This paper has questioned the importance of scale as a source of performance as measured by unit profit. Prior work has questioned PBM scale as a factor in containing drug spending / Adj. Rx, otherwise know as the average unit price.
Our general view is that scale is overrated as a source of PBM performance as measured either by average unit prices or by average unit profits. Theoretically, scale could be beneficial in negotiating rebates with Pharma and reimbursements with retail pharmacies, but the business model of large independent PBMs makes it more profitable for these PBMs to abstain from the exercise of this power.
24 25 26 As far as mail order operations are concerned, scale can lower dispensing costs and reimbursements paid by clients. But, the unit dispensing costs for an individual mail order pharmacy bottoms out around 30,000 to 50,000 Rx a week, which is far below the operating scale of dispensing pharmacies of the Big 3 PBMs. 27 Scale can also lower the costs and reimbursements for claims processing. But that does not imply that a client has to contract with one of the Big 3 PBMs to access these economies.
Small, independent PBMs can tap into claims processing scale by contracting out claims processing to SXC, a PBM software application service provider.
Finally, many of the important techniques for lowering the average unit price to clients has nothing to do with "brawn" but everything to do with "brains" and "smarts". Average unit price is the weighted average of unit prices of generics and brands with the weights being a function of the generic dispensing rate. While the Big 3 PBMs can deliver hard to match unit prices for brands and generics as a result of scale, smaller PBMs can overcome this disadvantage by delivering about a five percentage point higher GDR to clients.
Superior GDR is a function of smart benefit management, not scale. This includes a costeffective formulary design, and use of design elements such as co-payment structure, prior authorizations, and step-therapy programs to promote generics that are therapeutic equivalents to more costly brand brands.
If scale is overrated as a source of PBM performance, how is that the industry today is dominated by three large independent PBMs? The reason is that scale is the resultant of performance not the source. The history of the PBM industry is not scale leading to price leadership leading to market share without profit leading to further scale via price competition leading finally to profit.
The path to PBM concentration begins with an opportunity to capture opaque rebates leading to a deceptive pricing strategy that uses retained rebates to subsidize low-ball, transparent prices on benefits management, claims processing, and mail order brands leading to contract wins, scale, and profit. Today opaque margins on mail order generics have replaced retained rebates as a source of excess gross profits necessary to afford low-ball prices wherever there is contract transparency. We've also put a huge effort toward cleaning up some operational issues in our Medicare business. During our last quarterly conference call I shared with you a view that we've had organizational and operational stress in our company which really resulted from the multiple years of very substantial revenue growth.
As an example, during the enrollment period in 2009, we added approximately 650,000 new Part D members alone. The result of all this was significant administrative shortfalls in our enrollment area which affected our ability to provide accurate and timely information to CMS. Once our new Medicare team understood the shortfalls we devoted very substantial resources toward addressing all these issues and we feel that we're now making rapid progress.
.Also, Wellpoint was forced by Medicare to suspend any new enrollment in its Medicare Part D plans due to internal IT snafus. Consider the following quote from Wellpoint's CEO Angela
Braly during their 4Q2008 Conference Call: . 29 Over the past 6 months, we've been working with CMS to resolve issues identified as a result of our internal compliance audits and findings from a recent CMS audit. … While our IT resources are an important part of the compliance program, these issues were not related to a migration of a legacy system, and we who have been meeting with CMS on a regular basis regarding our remediation process, we were surprised by their recent actions. We're working closely with CMS and marketing an enrollment of the company's Medicare Advantage, and Medicare Part D products have been suspended until remediation efforts have been substantially completed.
But, slowly the sources of Big 3 PBM dominance -mail order generic margins and unmatched IT systems -are being undermined. The Wal-Mart's $ 4 prescription announcement in September 2006 marks the end of an era of "competition by convenience' and the beginning of an area of "competition by price" in the drug supply chain. We view the Wal-Mart announcement as more than an innocuous "publicity stunt". The specificity of the $4 price was designed to be the tipping point of an "idea epidemic" that large, independent PBMs might not be negotiating the best possible deals for clients.
Wal-Mart's strategy is to induce plan sponsors to put more pressure on their PBM vendors to bargain harder with the large drugstore chains. This pressure would destabilize tacit collusion among the Big 3 pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) -Medco, and Express Scripts, and CVS/Caremark --to hold up retail prices in order to make their mail order operations price competitive without margin erosion.
The emergence of SXC as a large, independent PBM software application service provider capable of handling large accounts is another development that can contribute to the undermining of Big 3 PBM dominance. 30 The existence of SXC puts smaller PBMs in position to win bids based on smart, cost-effective plan designs while contracting out the "heavy-lifting" of claims processing to SXC.
Also, the availability of independent mail order pharmacies, such as Walgreen and Wellpartner, enables smaller, independent PBMs with transparent ASO business models to offer competitive mail order prices even though these PBMs are a fraction of scale of the Big 3 PBMs.
Express Scripts as a Risk-Bearing Entity
The final section of the paper examines some of the regulatory issues that accompany Express Scripts' take-over of Wellpoint's risky, fixed premium plans held by small businesses, individuals, and seniors under Medicare Part D plans.
While Wellpoint will be the nominal underwriter of these contracts, the deal turns Wellpoint into a "front" while Express Scripts become the "risk-bearing entity". In other words, the Express Script -Wellpoint deal is a "fronting arrangement" according to the following definition from the Reinsurance glossary, 31 In a fronting arrangement, the licensed insurer (ceding company) that obtains regulatory approval for an insurance product, sells the product, and cedes all or most of the risk to a company that is not licensed to do business in the jurisdiction.
State governments have the responsibility for licensing "risk-bearing entities". They do this by requiring that such entities have adequate reserves on their balance sheets to cover potential losses, and by requiring that periodic financial statement be filed as support. Determining status as a risk-bearing entity and the need for licensing has presented state regulators with a number of problems in the healthcare area.
For example, physician group practices and hospitals sometimes accept capitated contracts providing them with a fixed PMPY fee regardless of actual patient usage. Such contracts involve a degree of risk and have raised the question for the need of physician practices and hospitals to be licensed as risk-bearing entities. The trend toward capitated payments will increase as healthcare reform involves replacing usage as the basis for reimbursements.
Another area presenting problems to state regulators has been independent PBMs who accept outsourced contracts from insurers or plan sponsors. Normally, outsourced benefits managers operate on an ASO model where all healthcare costs flow directly to the insurer or plan.
However, the Big 3 PBMs operate on a benefits reseller model with reimbursements flowing through their balance sheets. In this case, there is some financial risk of failure to reimburse providers due to lack of working capital.
Generally, the Big 3 PBMs avoid being the nominal underwriter of pharmacy benefits contracts.
For example, they have preferred to be the "Intel-inside" Medicare Part D prescription drug plans (PDPs), avoiding exposure to the risk inherent in these government-subsidized, but nevertheless, capitated plans. However, both Medco, under it own name, and CVS/ Caremark, under the name Silverscript, have decided to come out and sponsor Medicare Part D PDPs themselves. Accordingly, they have created insurance subsidiaries that they have registered in just about every state.
On the other hand, Express Scripts mostly has avoided any direct sponsorship of Medicare Part D PDPs. While they have created an insurance subsidiary, it has been licensed and reports activity in only a few states relative to the insurance subsidiaries of Medco and CVS/Caremark.
Consider the following statement by Express Scripts in its latest 10-K regarding the need to obtain state licensing as a risk-bearing agent. 32 
State Regulation of Financial Risk Plans.
Fee-for-service prescription drug plans are generally not subject to financial regulation by the states. However, if a PBM offers to provide prescription drug coverage on a capitated basis or otherwise accepts material financial risk in providing the benefit, laws in various states may regulate the plan. Such laws may require that the party at risk establish reserves or otherwise demonstrate financial responsibility. Laws that may apply in such cases include insurance laws, HMO laws or limited prepaid health service plan laws.
Currently, the Company does not believe that its PBM business currently incurs financial risk of the type subject to such regulation. However, if it chooses to become a regional PDP for the Medicare outpatient prescription drug benefit at some time in the future, the Company would need to comply with state laws governing risk-bearing entities in the states where it operates a PDP.
Below is a 
